In a trade secret infringement dispute, the SPC clarified that: the fact that an accused infringer had the right to access the trade secret does not mean that the manner in which it obtained the secret, or how it handled the secret afterwards, was necessarily proper. Whether such obtaining and handling was proper should be judged primarily by three factors: 1) the accused infringer's intent in obtaining the secret, 2) the manner of obtaining it, and 3) whether the acts carried out after obtaining it caused or were likely to cause the rights holder to lose effective control over the trade secret.
Case Background
Company A owns the code for a game project and claims that the game's software source code constitutes its trade secret.
X and Y are both former employees of Company A. X served as the operations and maintenance manager of the company's Department K, and Y served as head of Department K. During their employment, both signed confidentiality, non-compete and intellectual property protection agreements with the company.
Y left Company A in December 2019 and, in June 2020, established Company B, whose business was identical to that of Company A. X submitted a resignation application to Company A in June 2020.
In July 2020, an affiliate of Company A reported the matter to the police. According to the report, one week before X submitted the resignation application, the affiliate discovered during a routine internal cybersecurity inspection that, over a period of more than one month before applying to resign, X had downloaded the game source code without the company's permission, taken it off the company premises, and stored it on a computer that the company had not provided for him.
Further investigation revealed that X's misappropriation of the trade secret was instigated, induced and assisted by Y. The funds X used to purchase the computer that stored the trade secret came from a money transfer from Y, and the purchase invoice for that computer listed Company B as the purchaser.
Company A took the view that X, Y and Company B had jointly infringed its rights and brought proceedings before the court, seeking an order that they cease the infringement and jointly and severally compensate economic losses of more than RMB 4.28 million and reasonable expenses of more than RMB 510,000.
The first-instance court held that the game source code constituted Company A's trade secret. However, as a technical employee of Company A, X had the right to access and obtain the trade secret at issue. The evidence on record could only establish that X had obtained it; it could not establish that X had disclosed, used or permitted others to use it. Moreover, there was no evidence that X had disclosed it to Y or Company B, nor that Y or Company B had used or permitted others to use the trade secret. On this basis, the first-instance court dismissed Company A's claims. Company A appealed.
The Supreme Court's Decision
In September 2024, the SPC issued its final judgment: revoking he first-instance judgment; and ordered X, Y and Company B to immediately cease infringing Company A's trade secret, including ceasing to disclose, use or permit others to use the source code at issue, and to sign undertakings of confidentiality and non-infringement; and ordered the accused parties to jointly and severally compensate Company A economic losses of RMB 500,000 and reasonable expenses of RMB 398,760.
The Supreme People's Court held that, in determining whether a party with lawful access to a trade secret has violated Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the 2019 Anti-Unfair Competition Law, as in force at the time, the court must not look only at whether the accused infringer previously had the authority to access or obtain the trade secret, nor only at whether the manner of obtaining it corresponded to a type of conduct expressly listed in the statute. Instead, the court should comprehensively examine the accused infringer's intent in obtaining the trade secret and the acts carried out after obtaining it, and determine whether the infringing acts caused or were likely to cause the rights holder to lose effective control over the trade secret.
The right to access a trade secret does not mean that the manner of access and obtaining, or the handling of the trade secret afterwards, is necessarily proper. The illegal obtaining conduct regulated by Article 9, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the 2019 Anti-Unfair Competition Law covers not only parties that owe clear and specific confidentiality obligations, but also parties that owe no such clear and specific obligations. Even where a particular party has the right to access a trade secret, if that party obtains it by improper means on a particular occasion, Item 1 may still apply.
In this case, X provided no evidence that Company A had expressly permitted or acquiesced in employees taking office computers containing the source code trade secret off the company premises and back to their homes, still less any evidence that Company A had expressly permitted or acquiesced in employees downloading or copying the source code from office computers or other hardware devices onto their own removable storage devices. X knew or should have known that his conduct breached the confidentiality agreement.
Although X emphasized that downloading and copying the source code and taking it off Company A's premises was necessary to perform his work duties, he consistently avoided a key question: why, after completing those acts, he further deleted log records, tampered with jump server login records and deleted relevant data. Such conduct is plainly contrary to common sense.
According to the facts established, X had in fact been taking the code at issue off the company premises in stages and in a step-by-step manner well before 24 June 2020. The period from 24 June 2020 to 2 July 2020 exceeded one week. For a trade secret embodied in code, and given today's highly developed electronic transmission technology, it was entirely feasible in terms of time and conditions for the code to be transferred from X to Y and Company B during that period.
X's conduct violated both generally accepted business ethics and the commitment made in the confidentiality agreement he had signed. The means by which he obtained the trade secret were manifestly improper. Objectively, his conduct had already caused the source code to escape Company A's effective control and created a significant commercial risk of disclosure and use by others, and is therefore clearly attributable to him. His conduct falls within Article 9, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the 2019 Anti-Unfair Competition Law, namely "obtaining the rights holder's trade secret by theft", and Item 3, namely "disclosing, using or permitting others to use the trade secret in his possession in breach of a confidentiality obligation or in breach of the rights holder's requirement to protect the trade secret".
Y was a former employee of Company A and, during his employment, served as head of Department K and likewise signed confidentiality, non-compete and intellectual property protection agreements. Company B, which Y established after leaving Company A, also took game development and operation as its main business, so Y was plainly aware of the value of source code to business operations and competitive advantage.
While Y knew that X was employed by Company A and knew that X had signed confidentiality and non-compete agreements, Y still took the initiative to ask X whether he was interested in joining Company B and, in particular, asked whether X knew of or had access to Company A's game code. After X replied in the affirmative and said he had no storage device, Y promptly provided funds for the purchase of a computer by money transfer. X then used those funds to purchase the computer and completed the acts of taking the code home and transmitting it to that computer.
Y's conduct was carried out, on the one hand, on the basis of his own independent will and, on the other, on behalf of Company B and for the purpose of obtaining benefits for Company B. Y's conduct was therefore both a personal act and an act performed in the course of his duties reflecting the corporate will of Company B.
According to the facts established, X's infringing conduct was clearly carried out at Y's direction and with the substantial assistance Y provided. The purpose of X and Y was primarily to obtain Company A's trade secret, and to use it in Company B's subsequent operations. This case should not simply equate Y's conduct with the performance of his duties as legal representative of Company B, and thereby treat it as absorbed by the will of Company B; otherwise, the legal liability that Y should bear personally would be improperly excused.
Y's conduct falls within Article 9, Paragraph 1, Item 4 of the 2019 Anti-Unfair Competition Law, namely "instigating, inducing or assisting others to obtain or disclose the rights holder's trade secret in breach of a confidentiality obligation or in breach of the rights holder's requirement to protect the trade secret", and Article 9, Paragraph 3, namely "where a third party knows or should know of the fact that an employee or former employee of the obligee of trade secrets or any other entity or individual conducts any of the illegal acts specified in the paragraph 1 of this Article, but still accepts, publishes, uses or allows any other to use such secrets, such practice shall be deemed as infringement on trade secrets".
In this case, although the funds X used to purchase the computer for storing Company A's code came from funds transferred by Y via personal WeChat both X and Y knew that the purpose of downloading, copying and transmitting the code across different media was for Company B's subsequent use and development, and the purchase invoice for the computer listed Company B as the purchaser. This shows that Company B was both the instigator of X's infringing conduct and its beneficiary. In addition, Y's conduct was both a personal act and an act performed in the course of his duties reflecting Company B's corporate will. Company B's conduct likewise falls within Article 9, Paragraph 1, Item 4 and Article 9, Paragraph 3 of the 2019 Anti-Unfair Competition Law.
On the facts established concerning the contact, exchanges and interactions among X, Y and Company B, the infringing conduct of the three parties was plainly not three separate and independent acts of infringement, but a joint infringement based on close subjective collusion and close objective division of labor directed at the same trade secret. X, Y and Company B should therefore bear infringement liability in accordance with the law.
(2023) Zui Gao Fa Zhi Min Zhong No. 539
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